

Atelier 1 : « Continuité et ruptures en management international »

The Role for History in the Future of International Management: Perspective, Cases, Critique.

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Abstract

History has reemerged as a crucial interest for organizational and management studies, without which the particularity of an *international* reference to management could lose much of its *raison d'être*. Opening with a review of the *historical turn* in management analysis provides a conceptual frame for the text-mining exercise of the 71 papers from the 2013 Annual Meeting of Atlas-AFMI in Toronto. This allowed qualitative, case-study examination of the place of history as analytical concept in international management research. Both the absence in general of the historical figure, and its presence in 11 instances, furnish ammunition for assessing the utility of this concept for research. The paper closes with discussion of the limits of the work, and the descriptive value of the material for teaching and research.¹

Key Words: Management History; Institutional Theory; Symbolic Power; Corporate Governance; Critical Sociology

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History in Theory

...all theoretical discussions of historiography become enmeshed in the ambiguity contained in the notion of history itself. This ambiguity derives, not from the fact that the term history refers both to an object of study and to an account of this object, but from the fact that the object of study itself can be conceived only on the basis of an equivocation. (White 1984)

This study of the place of history in organizational and management action was triggered by the bold affirmation by Roy Suddaby (2016) concerning the new awareness of the importance of “historical consciousness” in the research community, marking the recently announced “historical turn in management thought”. While attention to this dialectical issue — {history as fact vs history as energy for consciousness}, is a fundamental concern in social-philosophy—i. e. Kant, Hegel, Marx, Durkheim, Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, in applied fields, it rarely surfaces.

Given the flurry of publications generated by Suddaby and his collaborators, this issue merits thoughtful consideration. In the past eight years, this group has generated seven major papers on the topic, published in a variety of respected journals. (Foster et.al., 2010; Mills et.al., 2015; Suddaby, 2016; Suddaby & Foster, 2017 & 2015; Suddaby et.al, 2014; Suddaby, Foster & Quinn-Trank, 2010).

We open with an overview of *history* as concept from the origins of management studies; then what occurred to sideline attention to it; and how ensuing developments in what might be called ‘historically neutral’ managerial research and practice led to problems for which renewed attention to the historical vector in management studies is called for. This sets the stage for the case-studies of history in management research that follow.

In the beginning:

The recently announced ‘historical turn’ has its own long history. In the beginning... before it was formally theorized or modeled, management was treated as a problem of practical ordering and order-giving. This began early in the 20th century with the texts by Taylor (1911) in America and Fayol (1916) in France. Taylor stressed the instrumental dimension of the problem with Fayol emphasizing the social-relational, symbolic dimensions of management. This was a period of mechanized war-making, with engineers mostly in charge of the chain of processes from the extraction of ore and coal, through the mills into factories designed to make ships, airplanes, military tanks and then, domestic products. It was reasonable that efficiency be the watch-word and engineering best preparation for managerial

direction. Although tempered somewhat in America by Elton Mayo (1933; 1945), with his attention to the human relations perspective, but with only minor attention for the Fayol's work in France, the technical-instrumental logic known as Taylorism soon dominated management research and training (Evans & Holmes, 2013; Follett, 1924; 1927).

The early writing on the management developed in the wake of the emergence of the social sciences (sociology, psychology, economics, political sciences, anthropology) that erupted during the second half of the 19th century. The social sciences, in turn, came into being, thanks to the transformation—during the first half of that same century, of History from informed story-telling into an academic discipline, with objective knowledge intentions. The intellectual grand-father of management is history, with its immediate parentage drawn from a high-bred mix of at least five Social Science disciplines. On that basis it is not difficult to see the Durkheimian DNA in the writings of Fayol, or that of Weber in Taylor, with Freud and other psychologists slipping in thanks to the Human Relations Perspective; that is not of course to overlook traces of Bentham and Adam Smith in Accounting.

By the end of WWII, the measure of successful management was reduced to commercial value in the then already globalizing market. This was necessary as a basis for establishing price for trans-national exchange, allowing the comparison of value of goods and services. This reinforced a reduction of the intellectual base of management to questions of finance, accounting and sales, treated comparatively using micro-economic modeling. Thus, of the five social sciences that contributed genetic material for the development of management, the result was to recognize economics as the principle contributor of the management blood-line, leaving aside to various extents Sociology, Psychology, Anthropology and Political-Science largely aside.

As a byproduct of this evolution in *scientific* management, the force of history as active ingredient research and practice was gradually lost. Of the five-mentioned discipline, Microeconomics is by design virtually bereft of historical baggage. With his texts based on experience in large industrial contexts, Drucker (1954) resisted this tendency. As a result, and not without opposition (Mintzberg 2003), his position lost much of its importance in the West. Elsewhere in the world, in India, for certain, Drucker is still studied, since in that cultural field, the evacuation of history from practical experience is considered a serious oversight.

History Returns

The problem with the evacuation of history from management was that this activity occurs within legally established, complex organizations. In quest for a key attribute of what Bourdieu (1996 / 1992) identified as an *authentic field*, management had gone its own way. That demand for *autonomy* left the study of *organizations* largely in the hands of the ‘other’ four social sciences, with Sociology first in line. During the 20th century, each of these disciplines attempted to become as empirical as Economics, which is to say detached from the humanized and thus historical side of social experience. Try as it might to become radically objective based on a somewhat distorted reading of Comte’s positivism, this effort proved extremely difficult for Sociology. The least bits of social organization are *human-relations*, framed by a plurality of individuals sharing a minimum of intersubjective values, beliefs and agreements. Direct study of normative webs is not possible with ordinary empirical tools, requiring the inclusion of history to appreciate meaning in social organization. Still, recently in France, a fresh effort to *dehistorize* and *objectivize* sociology has actively arisen, with effects yet to be evaluated (Bronner & Géhi, 2016; Dufoux, 2017).²

Suddaby by-passes this deeper historical background to open his analysis with the work of Alfred Chandler (1962). Chandler’s first major text, an essay on strategy, structure and history of the firm was applauded more for the acuity of his having been the first to recognize the trans-temporal and evolutionary aspect of enterprise development and management, than for the precision of the data on which this narrative was based. Thanks to privileged access to five of the largest US Firms at the time, his explanation of the dynamics of organizational structuring by top-management business strategy, elevated the notion of *Strategy* to a top spot among management disciplines (Pettigrew, 1998; Porter, 2008).

For the popularity of that book, Chandler was invited to Harvard Business School, as it was establishing its primacy in management education and research. Once there, Chandler (1977) contributed to the foundation on which the global hegemony of the Harvard Model rests, by composing what turned out to be a Pulitzer Prize winning historical narrative providing rational justification for the *managerial visible-hand*. In application, this provides a core principle for the USA business model, diffused world-wide as *managerialism* (Chauvière & Mick, 2013; Clegg, 2014; O’Brien, 2016).

² For a further discussion of the practical issues related to history as a social-intellectual problem, see: “La Querelle des Sociologues”, 2017; Le Monde 24 Novembre; Le Débat, 2017.

Until then, the famous *invisible economic hand* described by Adam Smith was largely dormant for lack of active agents for its execution in practice. This lacuna was filled, to believe Chandler, thanks to US-centered, Harvard trained, managerialists. By their efficiency-maximizing diligence in running the day-to-day affairs of enterprises, related to production and wealth enhancement, with their *visible-hands*, MBAs might certify in a down-to-earth fashion, the validity of Adam Smith's economic theory (Smith 1937 / 1776). This justifies the observation that managerialism was transformed into an ideology (Enteman, 1993; Daniel, 1998; Khurana, 2007; Klikauer, 2013; 2015; Martin-O'Brien, 2016; O'Brien & Martin-O'Brien, 2017). Considered critically, Adam Smith's perspective is only one possible historical narrative of productive relations among many (Alexander, 2011).

Organizational Research confronts Management Studies

The complex task of gathering data on enterprise activity was marked early on by the work of Phillippe Selznick (1949; 1956). He framed that from a sociological and institutional angle (Williamson, 1981; Suddaby et al., 2010; Powell, 2007), substantially enhancing its exploratory power. However, as Suddaby points out,

While Selznick's original study was highly attentive to history and historiography, subsequent research in the paradigm shifted quite significantly away from historical case studies to adopt a more quantitatively driven methodology that is markedly less attentive to history (Suddaby, 2016: 52).

The tendency since WWII has been to reinforce *Strategy* as the most valued of management specialties. This is a package of dispositions, à la Chandler, for organization change, mergers, adoption of new technologies, or the elimination of functions, units and employees. In this, middle-managers—people managers, line managers, team managers, function as buffers between top executive-strategists and labor, suppliers and clients. The objective is reduction of costs. The long-term problems caused by the cumulative effects of short-term strategic decision making has led the search for corrective measures, requiring the reinsertion of history in the managerial studies, and the use of critical strategies to investigate them.

History is Ambiguousness

In his paper on *historical consciousness*, Suddaby (2016) points to the problems intrinsic to it: what counts as data for management professors as 'business facts' is not identical with what historians consider 'historical facts'. The 'social fact' is of course a Durkheimian figure, indicating formal or informal normative standards, not established by individuals, but none the less constraining their personal action. Being purely symbolic, norms are active in social

situations before any individual arrive in them, indicating that they are of historical derivation. Resulting constraints are thus phenomenal in the full sense of the term, the materialization in practice of the historical residue of past practices and consensus of the firm. Historians focus more often on the timing and content of structural occurrences, then on inferring causal or other forms of dependence among them.

Normative constraint is an extremely potent determinant of enterprise action. *Labor Standards* issued in Geneva have world-wide ramifications, as do *Banking Rules* issue of Frankfurt, for what occurs with finance in all Western European Countries. Overlooking history is to neglect attention to normative influences on enterprise functioning, which are themselves historical in nature and thus dominating in the short run even if negotiable in the long run.

Critics of greater attention to historical factors in management studies may argue that this is unjustified for lack of factual measurement of *history* as concept. If one relies on the reductionist and linear causal modeling, this critique is valid. However, rather than ignoring it for lack of precision in its assessment, a promising possibility is to accept that the symbolic-normative content of organized processes is the matter of judgment. Exploring the justice of a shift away from exclusive reliance on objective knowledge in the study of social systems, in favor of greater concern for the exercise of historical judgement and creativity was central to my recent *Critique of Rationality* (O'Brien 2016). The recommendations proposed by Suddaby are parallel in nature; suggesting a new epistemology as a strategy of resolution.

Historical Turn

The figure of 'historical turn' for management studies was brought to the fore—with a *question mark*, in a paper by Clark and Rowlinson (2004) published in *Business History*. Partly owing to the enthusiasm with which Suddaby and associates followed it up, the theme has now taken on what appears to be an irreversible importance. For instance, *The Academy of Management Review*, has published a Special Topic Forum titled "History and Organizational Studies: Toward a Creative Synthesis" (Godfrey et.al., 2014). That theme is elaborated in a paper by Rowlinson et.al. (2014), highlighting the differences between historians and management scholars; as well as in a paper on organizational memory and narrative by Rowlinson et.al. (2014).

If the recommendation is followed, to "use historically grounded research in analyzing organizations", how might one decide what counts? The interpretative ambiguity

about historical narratives is the fundamental subject for the American critical-historian Hayden White (1972; 1980; 2010).³ He argues, that once they are past, the facts of historical events slide off into memory, details about which then depend on documents and recall which are always selective. Historians are none the less obligated by the *normative constraint* of their profession, to compose theses and books about the past that go beyond description in search of explanation. Unfortunately, the data needed to satisfy the contemporary cannon of science are at best, partially met. To generate a convincing narrative, the historian is obliged to fill in the gaps with creative speculation. When later read, this makes it impossible to untangle the fiction from fact (White (1987).

History provides a basis of understanding more than a matter of facts. Suddaby recounts how, during an address at meeting of Business Historians, he raised the name of White as the basis for arguing a point. “The crowd seethed. ‘That was not history,’ [he] was told, and Hayden White was ‘not a real’ historian. [He] thought he saw pitchforks” (Suddaby 2016: 47).

An equivalent difficulty arises when the historical-materialist method of Karl Marx is introduced in discussions of management. Unfortunately to ignore this dimension of social relations blocks access to the problems of social-cognition. That refers to the actual relational dynamics among managers and those managed, on the basis of which decisions are taken, conflicts resolved, priorities established and the like. Consistent with that, Suddaby’s recommendation is unsurprising:

... first we must establish a more rigorous description of how the ontological and epistemological distinctions both separate us and identify the spaces we might potentially agree upon. To accomplish this, I extend the bounds of my analysis beyond the somewhat narrow confines of business history to include a broader range of sub-topics of history, including cultural and social history, Marxist history, and even literary approaches to history (Suddaby 2016: 48).

Principles of Institutional Establishment

Even if opaque to the tools of scientific design, the importance of the symbolic, which is to say, the social-historical forces that shape each enterprise is critical if management studies of real enterprises are to have practical value. At the time of their origin, *principles of established* justify the manifest mission and institutional structure that a ‘founding’ or ‘start-up’ business will pursue. Those principles may be imposed by the authority of founders,

³ A Chapter on White’s extensive work is found in my *Critical Practice* (O’Brien 2013).

negotiated among stake-holders, or merely slipped into documents by legal experts to comply with local or international standards. Often underplayed at the beginning, through the years, these orienting *principles* come to serve as major determinants and constraints on management.

Summarizing Selznick (1956), Suddaby reinforces work dating from the early years of organizational studies, “suggesting that the founding conditions of organizations are infused with core values and meanings”, which come to define its essential “character”. Discussed in other language a decade later:

Stinchcombe (1965), argued that the core values of a powerful founder could be ‘imprinted’ on an organization and shape its character in ways that delimit choices and create a degree of path-dependent outcomes for the firm.

From this review of the place of history in management studies, the question turns empirical. What evidence is there from available research attesting to the value-added benefit from its potential generalization? To respond to that question, we offer a set of case-studies in the next part of this paper.

Cases of History in Managment

The place of history in management-related research is investigated by a study of the contents of 71 papers given at the *2013 Annual Meeting of Atlas-Afmi*, held in Montreal. Prior to the conference, submitted proposals were scrutinized by blind reviews. Accepted contributions were thus complete in advance of the conference, and provided to each attendee on a Pin-disc. That set of papers constituted the population for this exploratory case study. The content of each text was searched for the term “*histoire*”, as well as “history” (some of the contributions were in English). This term appeared in 21 of the texts, but was dealt significantly in only 11. The following case material is based on qualitative analysis of those 11 papers, in search of evidence about the use and utility of history in management research.

Technical Limits of this Research Strategy

Certain qualifications are necessary in advance. First, as for substance, the low frequency with which the issue was addressed at that conference suggests that the importance of *history* as foundational concept for management studies is latent at best. Since the data-base is a body of independent work by management professors with special interest in international management, that passivity about history merits critical explanation.

Second, as for method, we do not propose that this descriptive study of a set of papers from one association of academic specialists, principally oriented by a French cultural disposition, represents the universe of interest. Still, from a close reading of the 11 studies of interest provides valuable information about the place of history in such work. Furthermore, since the works under scrutiny are special regarding the historical-neutrality of the remaining 60 studies, we have effectively conducted an analysis of ‘deviant cases’. This is a common sociological strategy, referred to as attention to the ‘outliers’. Focusing in this way on the 11 ‘outliers’ differ from the normative-distribution of 71 papers, is informative as a grounded research strategy—of which this is a case; for developing an exploratory perspective, rather than testing hypothesis derived from existing ones.

The 11 studies of interest include attention to both general management issues as well as particularities related to international enterprise experiences; it is the latter which is highlighted in what follows. There is no effort to unravel the intention of the author, but only to extract evidence about the place of *history* in these works.

Each study is discussed in relation to the practical management problem that is the focus of the research, allowing a four-category presentation of findings:

- Four concern the *social-dynamics* of enterprise action;
- Two concern *marketing*;
- Two concern *headquarters-filial* relations;
- Three concern *enterprise-executive level* issues.

Each category and its cases will be discussed in turn.

History and the Social-Dynamics of Enterprise

The way cultural factors modify the social dynamics of firms is more lucidly demonstrated by cross-national studies, particularly when Western enterprise operate in non-Western sites This demonstrates the force of history, as a frame of meanings and interpretations, carried not just in the memory of individual managers or workers, but as part of the ‘institutional memory’ of a company as well. Issues related to this were the topic of concern for Hofstede, and it is not surprising to find them arising in papers from the 2013 Atlas-AFMI Conference. That is not to validate Hofstede’s conceptualization scheme, but to explore in operational terms what it means to say historical-cultural differences count?

Language Renders Historical Forces Visible

The study by Church-Morel and Bartel-Radic (2013) focuses on the implantation problems following a Swedish-Finnish bank merger. As they summarize it, citing work by Vaara et al. (2005), and Pikkari et al. (2005),

"... this merger... highlights the political aspects of the choice of common language, demonstrating that the choice can be seen as reenacting within the new organization a history of political domination among countries; [with]... human resource implications that result from a management strategy that imposes a common language; [such that]... career paths and promotion opportunities in this case become language-dependent. Finnish workers with a high level of proficiency in Swedish both benefitted from opportunities and were put at a disadvantage of having to act as gatekeepers and translate for their colleagues, which sometimes led to a feeling of being overwhelmed.

This description exemplifies what Bourdieu identified as symbolic-violence: the differentiatonal of positions and privileges based on historical, cross-cultural influences of a purely symbolic nature. In this Swedish Bank, purportedly driven by depersonalized, non-subjective, technically rational objectives, historical differences anchored in language are powerful influences on action.

Ethnicity Effects Enterprise Action as Lived History

The study by Susan Marie Apitsa (2013), focuses on ethnicity and equal opportunity. Tension related to that is common when enterprise activities traverse national, cultural, ethic frontiers. To begin, based on available literature, Apitsa observes:

...dans les recherches en management interculturel, l'ethnicité n'apparaît pas comme une dimension primordiale dans l'analyse interculturelle. De même, les travaux, qui utilisent ce concept, ne présentent pas l'ethnicité comme un élément d'analyse interculturelle mais plutôt comme un élément à mobiliser pour le succès des entreprises.

If so, then ethnicity issues are may be recognized for tactical reasons, as useful for PR purposes rather than as a basis of modified managerial strategy. From there, Apitsa has as intention:

...de dégager les éléments pertinents de l'ancrage [de l'ethnicité] dans le management interculturel, en retraçant brièvement l'histoire du concept et son [importance]... dans les choix de gouvernance, institutionnels, stratégiques et managériaux.

In that quest, the manifest objective was to capture the facticity of history in action, in so far as, citing Bentley (1987),

Dans sa conception objective, l'ethnicité se réfère à une identité partagée par un groupe de personnes sur la base d'une ou de plusieurs caractéristiques : l'histoire partagée, la tradition culturelle (coutumes familiales ou sociales et religieuses), l'origine géographique commune, le langage commun, la religion commune, la couleur de peau différente, les valeurs partagées.

Following anthropological tradition, this leads to elaboration of the mythic and factual historical influences that can intrude into MNC functioning —thanks to ethnic diversity.

Citing Kroeber et Kluckhohn (1952, 75-154), Apitsa recalls the centrality of history in the process:

... une culture consiste en modèles, explicites ou implicites, de normes de comportement acquises et transmises par des symboles permettant de distinguer entre eux les modes d'accomplissement des groupes humains ; ... la manière structurée de penser, de sentir et de réagir d'un groupe, surtout acquise et transmise par des symboles, et qui représente son identité spécifique ; elle inclut les objets concrets produits par le groupe. Le cœur de la culture est constitué d'idées traditionnelles (dérivées de et sélectionnées par l'histoire) et des valeurs qui leur sont attachées.

Historical Roots of Multi-National Teamwork Difficulties

Christoph Barmeyer (2013) explored the personal-historical factors that contribute to the commonly observed difficulties that occur in enterprise teams of mixed-nationality membership. He opened his text by underlining the importance of symbolic dimensions of social action for team dynamics, which are difficult to assess by objective technical measures, but crucial none the less:

Le travail en équipe au sein des organisations nécessite non seulement des compétences techniques mais aussi des compétences sociales qui influencent les éléments et les processus de la collaboration telles que communication, la coopération, le leadership etc.

This signals the potential error of excessive reliance on cognitive, objective factors when attempting to explain efficiencies and difficulties for the human relations of a firm (O'Brien 2016). As Barmeyer points out, it is faulty to assume that "technical competences" are the sole vector of influence for enterprise action.

One difficulty with studying historical influences is 'how far back to look', and Barmeyer took this problem seriously. To the extent that the issue with team-tension is linguistic, perhaps the source is less related to adult education or training, than to childhood socialization. To examine that possibility, he focused on a major European enterprise with technical activity conducted by teams principally composed of a mix of German and French employees. Using English as a link-language that is foreign to members of both culture

groups, he studied how similar terms and constructions, similar expressed intentions and judgments, meant differently for the Germans versus the French. Approaching the problem qualitatively and anthropologically, he attempted to identify the source of this form of recurrent misunderstanding, which seemed to be carried as a non-consciousness disposition, perhaps dating from their early life experiences.

To investigate that possibility, he developed systematic tableaux allowing comparison of how vocabulary and usage are established in *German Kindergartens* versus French *Écoles Maternelles*. He then sought parallel differentiations in language use by members of project teams in this company.

Suite à l'analyse d'exemples managériale au sein d'équipes franco-allemandes, nous aborderons les lieux de socialisation que sont le kindergarten allemand et l'école maternelle française afin de présenter leurs logiques de base divergentes et leurs conséquences sur le management interculturel.

While the scale of the ethno-methodological study is suggestive only, his research supports the common intuition that development of social skills in the largest sense, including the linguistic facility to perceive and express meaning, occurs early in life in family, micro-community and primary formal education. To the extent that culture is real, this leads to enduring institutional effects, due to the way history of a society is materialized in adult behavior, thanks to early learning, that may be modified from adolescence onward, but rarely eliminated.

Downplaying Historical-Cultural Differences

Cuilling Jiang (2013) focused on the ease of transfer of HRM practices from French parent units into sites operating in China. The abstract summary of findings is that, “Instead of cultural differences, institutional interactions and entry modes are the main restraints for the transfer of HRM practices”.

As Jiang acknowledges in his paper, that reported neutrality concerning cultural differences seems contrary to common understanding.

“Chinese context is challenging for foreign companies because it is considered to be profoundly different from western countries, in terms of culture, legal systems, labor markets and so forth”.

With that in mind, along with other guiding predilections, he interviewed senior managers in eight French firms. Contrary to the *Abstract*, the reported content from the interviews seems

to indicate a variety of ways that cultural-historical differences actively mediate the application of French HRM practices for subsidiaries located in China. One of the many examples that he reports is, "In a [Chinese] workplace, employees will not openly argue with superiors". Thus "the need to pay attention to 'face issues' by avoidance of communicating the negative aspects [of performance] directly in China".

One of the tactics for side-stepping modification of labor standards to fit foreign standards, is to out-source labor to Chinese "dispatching" agencies. "Casual labors" are not entitled to this fringe benefit because they are recruited by the dispatching company".

In China, being as casual labors are legal if they perform the services on temporary, substitute or auxiliary positions in companies. Many MNCs have a contract in place with a FESCO (Foreign Enterprise Service Company) for labor dispatching, payroll and/or additional services for parts of Chinese employees. This is a normal and typical phenomenon in China.

Since cultural differences persist, with the aim of allowing employees from both sides of the cultural frontier to 'learn' the ways of the other, he also discusses training programs and temporary transfers of managers from one country to the other. While, "Chinese employees place value towards international assignments", he admits that moving the other way is considerably less popular among those from the French side.

The frequency with which Jiang raises the 'leaning' problem suggests that surmounting by managers of the Chinese-France cultural frontier is very difficult to achieve. Learning about differences in the abstract is not without value for increasing cognitive sensitivity to differences. Indeed, "informants frequently mentioned their learning and awareness towards the cultural differences between France and China". But 'learning about' cultural differences that are deeply imbedded in history and expressed in complex webs of largely non-conscious institutions and intuitions, is not the same as modifying or reducing the gap in practical action among multi-cultural groups.

Marketing on History

One dealing with Wine and the other Beer, the two studies to be discussed in this Section are parallel in nature. The question is how to best market a French domestic product in foreign countries, when the meaning of the label is anchored in cultural history?

Power of Brand-Labeling based on Historical Image.

Painb ni and Thomas (2013), investigated the way a small wine domain attempted to capture an international clientele in the fast-moving, global market, in which French exclusivity in

production faces growing competition from volume producers backed by anonymous, speculative investors. Using a case study design involving in-depth interviews, they described the establishment of a meaning-laden reputation for this product by appealing to the cultural foundations of its production.

The domain and label of the product chosen for this study had a long family-centered history that furnished the basis for a promotional strategy:

Dans le cas de [Domain V], le nom du vin du domaine [X—Y—Z] synthétise son histoire : ‘X’ correspond à l’architecture de la maison du domaine viticole ; ‘Y’ est le nom de famille des anciens propriétaires du domaine ; ‘Z’ est le nom de la rivière longeant le domaine. La marque s’appuie ici sur son héritage alors que les producteurs du Nouveau Monde doivent le plus souvent construire une identité de marque ex-nihilo en s’appuyant sur les outils du marketing.

Marketing is a competitive undertaking where history—if properly used, is a powerful dynamic. Sometimes underplayed in research, this aspect of the phenomenon is crucial for its appreciation. Reference to ‘New World Producers’ by these authors points to competition from newer, non-European sites, such as the Napa Valley in California. In this battle, history constitutes important ammunition:

Cette étude exploratoire du rôle du marketing entrepreneurial dans l’industrie du vin illustre comment une PME française indépendante parvient à gérer les mutations de l’environnement mondial en valorisant son ancrage culturel, tout en poursuivant son développement international. ... Cette stratégie s’accompagne logiquement d’une stratégie de marque en cohérence avec l’histoire, les valeurs et la mission du domaine sans pour autant se fonder sur une politique de marketing-mix.

Although difficult to account from the purely economic side, this study demonstrates the force of history in cross-cultural management studies, when unmasked by use of a qualitative social-science method. Without history, there is no culture force in the present, and thus little to take into account in the diachronic sense, concerning the symbolic qualities by which clients are attracted and held. As the authors affirm (citing Beverland, 2005),

Une stratégie de marque efficace doit également refléter sa différenciation à travers la communication de son histoire, de sa vision, sa mission et des objectifs du domaine.

Product History as Market Value.

The marketing study by Urban (2013) shifts attention from wine to beer. The problem is similar, but the approach somewhat different. The figure of history finds its way into this text

as major indicator of the object to be marketed. Beer is a culturally anchored product but also a universally marketable one. This opens it as easy target to be overwhelmed by new lines that are produced in giant factories, constrained by a minimum of technical standards, but marketed in campaigns backed by major global speculators.

The importance of history as social fact for this marketing problem is boldly affirmed by Urban:

...l'entreprise reste aussi une organisation humaine et les consommateurs sont des hommes qui ont une histoire et des modes de vie auxquels ils tiennent. Le comportement des humains ne s'explique pas seulement par la rationalité économique ou financière, mais aussi par leur ancrage culturel. L'histoire de la bière et de l'industrie brassicole livre une saisissante illustration de cette dualité.

The particularity of the treatment of history in this case is the focus on duration and differential acceleration of temporality, to counter tendencies to consider history as only a reference to the dead-past. The clairvoyance of the resulting observation arrives at a question of universal importance: can history survive the attack being mounted against it by managerialism?

La vitesse de transformation industrielle, induite par la 'dynamique du management international' s'oppose ici à la lenteur d'évolution du produit, culturellement bien 'ancré' dans la durée. Dans un premier temps, on relèvera l'importance de la culture matérielle comme composante de 'l'ancrage culturel' et le rôle des éléments de transformation de cette culture initiale que constituent des événements historiques, des innovations technologiques ou des modifications comportementales (le plus souvent insufflées par de nouvelles pratiques managériales). Dans un deuxième temps, on introduira les facteurs plus récents de la dynamique managériale, infléchi par les jeux de pouvoir et d'argent. Cette 'culture financière' globalisée, va déconnecter la culture industrielle de son ancrage territorial. Par la suite, dans un troisième temps, on verra, au vu de l'histoire des deux premiers groupes brassicoles mondiaux, que la dynamique du management international/global n'est pas le résultat de l'application de recettes qui pourraient s'apparenter à un 'one best way' théorique, mais de manoeuvres stratégiques et de gouvernance différenciées, conduites par le 'top management'. Ce sont bien les hommes, leurs compétences et leur culture, et non pas des mécanismes de conduite du changement désincarnés qui orientent le développement des entreprises et des Sociétés, mais 'leur' culture personnelle serait-elle une variable vraiment déterminante par rapport à d'autres variables véhiculées par leur contexte ? A voir (Urban, 201, 6).

History Mediates Local Enterprise Choices

The two studies to be considered next expose the way historical, national, cultural differences, though purely symbolic in nature, are major mediating forces in the relations that link the headquarters of MNCs with their foreign subsidiaries.

History Mediates Local RSE Options

Dupriez and Vanderlinden (2013) studied the use by French MNCs of RSE [Ang: CSR] programs. The newly recognized expectation that this be part of the package to justify enterprise action, places international interests in a curious bind. On one hand, standards regulating debt, stocks and bonds, require financial objectives be pursued in a fashion indifferent to special interests, including national interests. Yet once a business license is secured and local activity begins, sustainability often requires considerable attention to the local social-political environment via RSE projects.

Given the global variety of local histories, an appropriate RSE project in one location may constitute a violation of standards in another. In the end, results are evaluated on a universal basis not much different from those applied in the financial accounting. In short, complying with HQ objectives using RSE projects, in support of local, national, culture-group relations is a constant dilemma for MNCs.

Dupriez and Vanderlinden inquire about how authentic corporate social responsibility might be pursued. They studied an RSE project in Morocco, using a “contextual approach” for evaluating how enterprise in that country attempt to carry out this requirement in ways that balance fit between local social-political environment and international business standards.

Une approche contextuelle a permis de repérer la dynamique reliant les orientations stratégiques, l'organisation et la culture d'entreprise dans laquelle les actions de RSE, redistribuées, ont pu trouver sens et efficacité.

The issue for our purposes concerns less the content of the project than with the method for its assessment. Citing Wacheux (2006) to buttress their position, Dupriez and Vanderlinden discuss their field-work:

Sur le terrain, le chercheur va capter non seulement des faits et des attitudes mais tout ce qu'il y a d'implicite dans la manière dont les acteurs appréhendent la réalité qu'ils vivent de l'intérieur et le contexte dans lequel se construit leur compréhension de cette réalité. Si on refuse de considérer ces acteurs comme des 'automates programmables' et si les événements observés ne répondent pas à un schéma déterministe, tout phénomène peut

être considéré comme ‘une énigme à résoudre’. Le discours utilisé par les acteurs pour relater les événements est lui-même imprégné de toute une histoire ressentie. ‘Le passé, le présent et le futur se cristallisent dans l’instantanéité de la rencontre et structurent le dialogue’.

This indicates a protocol for qualitative field-work of considerable density and intensity, conducted by highly experienced investigators to unravel the historical threads that bear on contemporary enterprise action. Much more easily said than done.

Historical Component of Enterprise Ecosystem for Site Location

Bédé (2013) focused on factors influencing the attractiveness of alternative sites for enterprise activity. This is related to the existence of “enabling ecosystems” (OECD, 2015) as support for enterprise activity. Thus conceived, the components of the operating environment include symbolic, historically anchored factors, equally important as are technical-instrumental considerations.

Bédé reviews what is known about the power of geographical places to attract enterprise activity. Although this case was the Port of Marseille as transit point for trade, the interest here is about the importance of location for foreign enterprise installations in general. He framed the work as attention to the question of “territorial attractiveness”, which is particularly important for seaports, because, “historiquement, les ports représentent un lien incontournable entre le transport maritime et le transport terrestre”.

The potency of social-economic ecosystems varies according to the institutional value of different physical locations:

La proximité institutionnelle fait référence à la coordination et à la production commune des acteurs par leur adhésion à des représentations, des règles d’action et des modèles de pensées communs ... La notion d’identité du réseau coexiste avec la proximité institutionnelle et dépend fortement d’une histoire commune et de liens construits dans le temps

This study describes the importance of the historically established traditions of a given site of economic activity for the success of new enterprise activity planted therein. This is valued in practice by the way logistical facilities and individuals with important savoir-faire are or are not already in place. Whatever the strategy from a distance, operation success depends in large measure on managerial capacity to fit functional processes with the local context. Misreading the force of local history of a site can lead to serious managerial problems for a new business activity planted within it.

History Mediates Board / Executive Action

To conclude our case analysis, we turn to the Siege Social of international enterprise, for examples of the place of history in central-office affairs. MNCs are obligated to apply the standard economic model if they hope to be treated evenhandedly by international investors. Even if each enterprise is a unique historical object, having come into being for particular reasons, at a particular time, and is driven by particular principles of establishment, the contemporary economic model is based on universal micro-economic assumptions. That model is de-historized by design, and foreign to the institutional approach of a social science nature (Williamson 1981). To succeed in the international arena, management of MNCs is driven by the objective of minimizing transaction costs (North, 1990); of which history is a significant carrier.

Thus, *being global—acting local* is extremely difficult to manage for MNCs. The challenge is enormous to achieve adequate fit between central office strategy and local national, cultural, historical reality. Thus, the question: how do Head-Office executives attempt to balance the demand for universal accountability against local socio-historic sensibility?

H-Q use of RSE to Deal with Local Subsidiary Particularities

Pestre (2013) studied the deployment of RSE resources by five very large French MNCs, with considerable international experience and active subsidiaries in a number of foreign locations. The HQ of each has an executive office responsible for RSE oversight, and the question concerned how this is managed. The HQ objective is to authorized deployment of resources in ways that comfort local activity at a minimum of cost and meets the demands for HQ accountability. In turn, local filials have a RSE officer, who must actualize a strategy of local support that complements central-office strategy.

Local RSE agents are aware that the activity requires sensitivity to local situation, the details of which they are expected to penetrate for strategic reason. In the end, the objective fact of the programs supported is less important than the subjective view of these projects, both locally as well as back in the HQ. The delicate nature of this undertaking is evident from the way Pestre presents an extensive review of literature.

Citing the classic language of Howard Becker (1985), Pestre acknowledges that managing an RSE project requires the talent of a “moral entrepreneur”, based on an erudite “moral imagination”. Citing Donaldson and Dunfree (1999), Pestre summarizes the skill

required for conduct of the RSE agent role as exceptional “creativity, innovation and learning capacity”. Capturing the balancing-act facing local RSE agents, navigating in a context of normative contradictions, it is evident that: « se conformer aux hypernormes exige souvent une créativité managériale considérable »

This struggle to rationalize the subjectivity of local action in pursuit of depersonalized business objectives of non-local enterprise would not exist were it not for the way history is a determinant factor for economic success. This explains the use of aesthetic images, exemplifying what Machiavelli (who wrote on the *Art of War*) might have considered international management as *work of art*. In keeping with that, Pestre summarizes emanations from the HQ to the fillials in a phrase : « Le type de soutien apporté par la direction générale est un soutien principalement d’ordre moral et symbolique ».

An example of this practice was discussed by a central executive in one of the five MNCs he studied.

[Son rôle consiste} ... à rassembler tous les 3 mois les ‘faits marquants’. [Il demande en effet à chaque filiale de présenter, succinctement en 2 ou 3 pages, leurs initiatives. C’est une remontée d’information qui permet lui de constituer un réservoir d’expérience. Ensuite, [ils] s’en sert notamment lors de la publication du rapport annuel de RSE. Il y a des milliers d’actions, mais on sélectionne certains sujets qui sont particulièrement intéressants et qui deviennent ce que l’on appelle des ‘histoires de management’. Puis on adopte une ligne éditoriale avec une thématique et on choisit un certain nombre d’initiatives dans notre portefeuille d’histoires ».

Our paper opened with Suddaby’s attention to the recent ‘historical turn’ in management studies. Although not cited earlier, in his most recent paper, he identifies four ways ‘history’ is treated in relation to enterprise action. There is: “History-as-Fact, History-as-Power, History-as-Sensemaking, and History-as-Rhetoric” (Suddaby, 2017,20).

In this case, the strategy adopted at the HQ level appears to best exemplify the use of RSE *History-as-Rhetoric*, with the result being of value as an important component for central-office story-telling in the Annual Report.

History Mediates ‘developpement durable’ with Local NGOs

Another dimension of MNC activity that requires constant application of the managerial art is the need to attend to the NGOs that nowadays haunt the globe, in service of ideological perspectives that are often in opposition to the business objectives of Fortune-500 companies. In this regard, the central figure of interest for Pierre-Charles Pupion (2013) is

“développement durable”. The way this problem is linked to history is clear. Citing Brundtland (1987), it is defined as « un développement qui répond aux besoins du présent sans compromettre la capacité des générations futures à répondre aux leurs ».

This study focuses on the European Bank Sector, vis-à-vis local NGOs in the role of local ethical watchdogs:

L'analyse des rapports de développement durable des trente plus grandes banques européennes montre qu'elles en restent à une vision classique d'une relation marquée sous le sceau de la crainte de la dénonciation de leur responsabilité par les NGO et d'une action symbolique de mécénat.

The power of NGOs is linked to the lack of central agency control for the institutional environment in many underdeveloped areas of the globe.

L'environnement institutionnel dans lequel évolue l'entreprise apparaît fragmenté, dans la mesure où il est composé d'un ensemble de parties prenantes aux attentes, valeurs et intérêts différents. Pour une même action donnée l'entreprise peut être 'jugée' différemment selon qu'il s'agisse de telle ou telle partie prenante. L'influence des ONG est réelle et prégnante dans cette évaluation collective des actions d'une banque. Toutefois celles-ci disposent selon leur histoire et la cause défendue d'une influence plus ou moins grande.

From the perspective of the HQ of a money-center bank, success in this area of corporate concern is certified by a lack of denunciation by NGOs from one year to the next. NGOs are not approached as potential sources of 'legitimization', but only as potential sources of trouble, as 'institutional whistle-blowers' that can intrude on the orderly conduct of business.

The analysis of the sustainability reports of the thirty biggest European banks shows that banks don't use NGOs' expertise to legitimize their operations and practices. They remain in a classic vision of NGOs marked by the reputation risk and the symbolic action of philanthropy.

HQ funds are often used, citing Howard Becker again, to 'cool out the mark'. In bolder language this means buying the silence of NGOs. One supposes, for that reason, that a central source of revenue for NGOs is to level a threat against an enterprise or industry, then accept to remain silent in return for 'gifts, grants and contracts'. A counter-action is for a collective of MNCs to mount an attack to discredit the credibility of intrusive NGOs. The recent case of this in England, against OXFAM about sexual harassment exemplifies this tactic.⁴

⁴ In a fashion, the problems facing Lafarge for donating funds to what Western legitimists term a 'local terrorist operation' in Syria, is a form of RSE in the extreme, and in fact a rather common MNC practice for establishing an inexpensive way to assure against risk (Jean-Amans & Abdellatif, 2013).

Historical Mediation on Board / Executive Action

The final issue to be elaborated in this secondary-analysis exercise is the way history plays a role at the highest level of Enterprise Action, influencing both the composition of the Board of Directors of MNCs as well as the remuneration for the CEO. The base for this ambitious and revealing study by Seny Kan (2013) consists of interviews with the Board Secretary of eight very large French MNCs. His question is:

... quelle est la pratique des hauts dirigeants des groupes multinationaux français en matière de structuration de l'équipe dirigeante et conseil d'administration de leur société mère au regard de la dimension internationale de leurs activités ?

As with the other ten papers included in this analysis, the figure of history appears rarely, yet its force is evident when the issues under discussion are considered causally rather than only descriptively. Getting to that requires a qualitative approach, with interviews that open on some facet of current practices, then trace the temporal threads back to their points of origin. Citing Yin (2009) and Ghauri (2004), Seny Kan summarizes the objective of this method, as follows:

L'ensemble de notre questionnement de recherche étant de type 'What' et 'How', ... , le recours à une étude qualitative par étude de cas nous permet de produire une connaissance de type exploratoire mais aussi explicative.

The two issues of interest reported in this paper concern the determinants of the “internationalization of the Executive Team” and the consequence of that for the remuneration package for the CEO.

Bypassing details, the norm in France regarding Board Composition is set by AFEP-MEDEF. The standard is not to hold a director for more than 12 years, with half the members at any given time being ‘outsiders’. Turnover of Executive Committee membership in these companies was found to generally comply with the ‘12-year rule’, but not always.

Among other reasons, this recommendation does not fit with the historical tradition of family-founded firms. Still numerous in many countries, such firms are heavily anchored in the national-cultural system of their country of origin. The move toward ‘professional’ executive leadership counters this historical tradition, raising questions about the justification of executive practices that have been followed since the advent of industrial capitalism. This is evident from the content of one of Seny Kan’s interviews:

[Notre] conseil d'administration a retenu les recommandations du rapport AFEP-MEDEF dans l'appréciation de l'indépendance de ses administrateurs, sauf pour le critère d'ancienneté de 12 ans. Le Conseil considère en effet que, dans une activité de long terme, et pour une société dont la direction a une grande stabilité, une durée longue d'exercice des responsabilités d'administrateur apporte davantage d'expérience et d'autorité, et renforce l'indépendance des administrateurs. Messieurs [X, Y, et X] sont ainsi administrateurs de [notre société] depuis plus de 12 ans.

As the international reach of the large French Societies has expanded, there has been a parallel diversification in the composition of their Board of Directors and the Executive Committees.

... [la proportion d'administrateurs indépendants est] très nettement guidée par la résonnance internationale du groupe et notamment le fait qu'on a un actionnariat lui aussi très international (...) britanniques, américains et autres, mais surtout britanniques et américains.

This signals a major alteration in executive board composition, necessitated by rapid globalization of business activity. As reported in one interview:

Le directoire est composé de deux français et de trois américains. On peut dire qu'il y a dix ans il n'y avait que des français. Aujourd'hui le chiffre d'affaires... représente à peu près 35% en Europe, 35% aux Etats-Unis et 30% dans le reste du monde. Ça se traduit directement dans la composition de l'équipe dirigeante au niveau du directoire puisqu'il y a trois personnes sur cinq qui sont américaines. Et dans le comité exécutif où il y a douze personnes, il doit y avoir également une majorité d'américains. Ça veut dire qu'on est vraiment dans un système de gouvernance qui est maintenant par nature franco-américain.

While the push is for inclusion of non-French representatives in Executive Bodies from nations where business activity is greatest, this is tempered by history, both national and corporate:

[La composition] est le reflet d'une réponse aux recommandations émanant du système de gouvernance englobant à l'échelle nationale et/ou internationale. Cette relation est médiatisée par la nature, historiquement ou présentement, publique de l'actionnariat.

The internationalization of the Executive Board is mirrored by the way compensation packages are established for corporate executives. As summarized by Seny Kan :

Pour l'analyse de la rémunération du DG, les propos des interlocuteurs convergent vers l'existence d'un marché des dirigeants dont les pressions s'exercent certes en local mais aussi et surtout internationalement. Ils mettent tous en avant des benchmarking avec la rémunération des dirigeants du

même secteur d'activité ou d'un secteur voisin tant au niveau national qu'international.

While this process of 'benchmarking' based on international comparisons is even-handed in a certain way, it denies the historical differences between countries in the assessment of value for success of an enterprise. Although this is not discussed in this paper, effectively, the salary levels for the employer-base of a French society, is local and national in orientation, while top executives are compensated based on global international comparisons. That international comparison is dominated by indexes 'made in America', which being the global economic empire, rewards its executive leaders in ways that are less sustainable in countries peripheral to the USA-Empire, such as France.

How are those historical contradictions resulting from global reconstruction of the business environment to be dealt with, and what is the nature of the International managerial art best called for? That question remains open, as does the need for incisive research that incorporates the historical dimension into International Management studies and teaching.

Conclusions and Critique

What have we learned from this qualitative study of a set of research reports, from which we extracted systematic information, interpreted from a Critical Sociology Perspective, addressing the question of *History* for International Management research, training and practice. A review of the process is in order.

Our Method of Procedure

The recently announced *historic-turn in management studies* suggests a form of intellectual pirouette in management research. If so, and if it can be demonstrated that history-as-forgotten constituted an important oversight, then until this occurred, management training and research had been deficient. If so, its ontological base has been misconstrued because its epistemological treatment has been misdirected. That proposition is an extreme critique for management studies.

This study opened with attention to recent papers published by Suddaby and his collaborators. In spite of the claims therein, we still must ask: has history really been ignored during recent decades in management research and teaching? And even if, so, what is the value-added from considering the historical dimension in management research problems, and assuming such value exists, what are the hinderances which allow that force to be easily ignored, or render it difficult to study?

Gaining insight about this led us to a block of publicly accessible research reports, concerned with diverse aspects of management theory and practice, prepared for a scientific congress of International Management Research. Each of the reports was peer-reviewed, and thus we need not question the quality of their contents, and included based on peer review. A content analysis was used to examine that population of texts to identify the use of history as a concept in the reported works, and the value-added thereof.

The Case Studies as Evidence on History

Findings in a Brief

The 71 texts in this block of studies from the 2013 Congress the French Association of International Management were searched for *histoire* and *history*, and forms rooted there in (i.e. *historique*); with only 11 found to have seriously expanded on the place of that figure for research. Our analysis of the cases where the figure of history is used significantly, supports the following general observations:

1)-History is important in international marketing; most often used to embellish products and stake out market space;

2)-History is important for unraveling why and how human-relations in multi-cultural teams pose special management challenges for MNCs;

3)-History is important as mediating influence between enterprise head-office in one country and subsidiary operations in another; finally,

4)-History has impact at the top level of Enterprise Executive and Board Direction for MNCs, both as mediator to be considered and source of uncertainty in reference to globally dispersed units; rendering difficult the application of universal technical, administrative and financial standards which, by law, are supposed to be applied by MNCs no matter where their operations reach.

Difficulties with History as Concept:

An elusive concept to treat as an active force, *history* enters the picture because international action is inherently cross-cultural. Culture is important pragmatically to the extent that it leads to the materialization of aspects of the institutional past as a force in the present. History thus conceived is the energy that carries culture into the present, and beyond. The research cases of interest here were all intended to explore international management

problems. We propose the following possible explanations for the absence of attention to *history* in 60 of the 71 papers in this pool:

1)-History is so commonly recognized as central for research bearing on International Management that most researchers overlook its inclusion.

2)-History is not included in research of this nature for conscious or unconscious reasons related to the ideology of managerialism; which is anchored in treatment of managerial objectives in keeping with micro-economic standards of efficiency and profit, in a way that is indifferent to history.

3)-As emphasized in the Introduction of this paper, the force of historical expression for enterprise management, related to causal movement and meaning of humanized action, is largely opaque for the tools of rational science. Its effects can be detected but not measured using reductionist tools. To study history tends to yield descriptive results that do not qualify as reliable evidence under the standards of the Western Canon of Science, radically reducing the likelihood that papers based on historical data will be accepted in top-rated journals.

Treated affirmatively, this lack of attention to history in international management research points to an important problem for future research: conducted on a panel of management school professors regarding the place of history in their research and pedagogical activity.

Difficulties with the Historical Method

1)-*Generalization Issues*: This method requires intensive exploration of a few cases, generally eliminating the extensive reach of studies of large samples of enterprise types. Small sample studies are difficult to publish.

2)-Epistemological Issues:

The Reductionist Method: Since Descartes, the rational method of understanding involves selecting an object for study, identifying its elementary components, studying the relations between those components, and representing the patterns of relations in a mathematical formula. This is the reductionist method, where whole-entities are explained by attention to causal relations between their parts. Under ideal circumstances, this process is carried out in a laboratory, indifferent to cultural and temporal variations. Since the Italian Renaissance, the West has been organized based on this reductionist epistemology, captured by the figure, the *Western Canon of Science*.

Epistemology generates Ontology: it is said (Bourdieu among others) that a science gains its autonomy by defining a singular object of study, over which it is in sole command. Raised to the level of Western Civilization, the rationalist epistemology is valid in so far as it identifies as suitable objects for study those entities that might be understood by reducing them to their least bits, in a way that is indifferent to culture and time; in other words, in a way that is blind to history. For *fully modern* researchers, adopting this Canon for their science is necessary for entry into the field, getting their papers published.

The Historical Method: The historical method of research, which more accurately, is the historical-materialist (H-M) method of research, is different, in that it does not sacrifice the whole to study the parts. As pointed out in seminars on the philosophy of science, reductionist method is the tool for post-mortem analysis: it can explain why a body died, but never explain why one lives. The H-M method preserves the whole, and thus can study life forms, which includes the life of institutional forms that are produced and reproduced as the *materialization of the history* of human action. Management as a social role within an enterprise as social form is a living process. If the point of research is to identify promising points of entry for its modification, reinforcement or replacement; or about the relations of any such living social entity with others of like or different type, it is possible to back-tracking into its history, to locate the constituents of its emergence. This enhances the success of plans intended to support or modify current practices, as needed.

For those who think schematically, use of a reductionist method is to treat the determinates of interest in their *synchronicity*; while use of a historical-materialist method implies adding a *diachronic* approach in one's work. From maximum effectiveness, a mixture of attention to diachronic and synchronic forces and relations yields best results.

Difficulties with Reporting and Publishing

1-Historical Analysis often requires reporting research in narrative form, perhaps accompanied by dynamic graphics of an aesthetic nature. This returns us to the quotation that opens this paper, concerning the profound *ambiguity* intrinsic to that form of presentation of results. However, even if a report is factual in detail, the result is *words, words, words*. As a personal example, I gave a copy of my 2014 book to a bright doctoral student at a school in India. A few months later he reported he had read it and found it very important: his only query, was concern about *all those words* of which there were *so many*!

2-The demand for Power-Point Graphics and Excel Spread-Sheet summaries of data is far less pertinent for research with a solid historical vector in its method, than for reductionist studies based on a mass of point-reference detail. It takes a great deal of time to read and internalize 30 pages of historical narrative, but only a couple of minutes to size-up a Tableau or Graphic Diagram.

On Historical Consciousness?

1-We might conclude that Suddaby's observation that bringing *history* back into management research and teaching is vital if the depth of understanding needed to justify its amelioration is to be assured.

2-We might decide to take history seriously and build it into methods of research seminars as well as collect studies that integrate it, for the publication of instructional manuals. This would include attention to ethnomethodology and qualitative inquiry, which is difficult to learn and laborious to conduct.

3-We might conclude that the Western Cannon of Science is the only valid epistemology, and research aimed at credible publishing must live up to it or else; by leaving history out.

To close, we might reconsider the famous—if not infamous text by Suddaby (2006) on *what grounded research is not*. The real issue behind that is: *what research based on the Standard Scientific Cannon is not*. It appears reasonable to assert that research for international management that focuses on enterprise action across cultural, national, ethic and linguist frontiers must be grounded in history, if it hopes to carry meaning. This implies that elimination of *history* from the field of concern threatens *la raison d'être* for International Management Studies; non?

End of Text

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